Abstract: Proxy signatures allow a signer to delegate signing ability to a proxy signer. Many schemes have been proposed for proxy signatures under typical security requirements. The authors propose a proxy signature model with extended security requirements. Based on Shamir's online/ offline signature scheme, a proxy signature scheme is proposed for the model. In addition to the typical requirements, the proposed scheme satisfies other very important security requirements. It is shown that the scheme can provide signature indistinguishability, restrict the proxy signing power, provide signature unlinkability, resolve internal disputes, and is more efficient.
Introduction
Proxy signature is a signature scheme where an original signer delegates his/her signing ability to a proxy signer to enable the proxy signer to generate signature on behalf of the original signer. Proxy signature schemes find applications in a variety of computing environments such as mobile agents for e-commerce [1], grid computing [2] , global distribution networks [3] , mobile communications [4] etc. There are four main entities involved in proxy signature schemes: original signer (O), proxy signer (P), verifier (V), and judge (J) for dispute resolution.
Mambo et al. [5] first introduced the concept of proxy signatures in 1996. The signature schemes were classified in three main types: full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant. In full delegation, O gives its private key to P. In this type of delegation, the signatures generated by P cannot be distinguished from those generated by O. However, dispute between O and P on a signature cannot be resolved. In partial delegation, O generates a proxy signature key from its private key and gives it to P. P uses this key to sign on behalf of O. In this case, the signatures from O and P are distinguishable, and so the scheme may not be suitable for situations where identity of P needs to be kept secret. In delegation by warrant, O issues a warrant containing a message part and signature key to P. The signatures by P consist of the signature using the signature key in the warrant and the warrant itself. The identity of P may or may not be revealed depending on the construction of warrant.
We introduce a delegation by warrant model for proxy signatures with extended (and different to some extent) set of security requirements as compared to those used in most existing proposals. In our model, the delegation of signing ability is an internal affair between O and P. Any other entity, including V, is considered to be an external entity for the delegation operation. In other words, V is able to verify the signature on given message like a regular signature verification using only O's public key. However, the actual identity of the signer (O or P) is hidden from V. In fact, the delegation of signing ability is considered as a confidential operation where V may not even know if there exists a separate P. On the other hand, in case of dispute between V and O or even between P and O, the model is able to resolve the dispute. Further, it may be necessary for O to delegate the signing ability in a restricted manner. Our model provides one-time proxy signature. Since no more than one proxy signature can be securely generated per delegation warrant, the ability of P can be restricted by issuing required number of delegation warrants. Other constraints such as validity period, liability amount, or even a specific application can be included in the warrant to further restrict P's signing ability.
In the following we list the security requirements for our model. Some of these requirements have been previously listed by Mambo et al. [5] and Lee et al.
[1] for their models.
Strong unforgeability: Only a designated P can generate a valid proxy signature; any other party, including O, cannot generate a valid proxy signature to impersonate a particular proxy signer. However, O can designate itself as a selfproxy.
Verifiability: Validity of a proxy signature as well as the delegation of O on a given message can be verified using the public key of O and other public parameters.
Signature indistinguishability: Regardless of identity of the actual signer, selfproxy O or a separate P, V can verify the validity of signature using a single regular signature verification algorithm.
Signature unlinkability: (a) Given a valid signature, no third party, including V, can link a signature with the identity of the actual signer (selfproxy O or a separate P).
(b) Given a pool of valid signatures, no third party, including the V, can link two signatures from the same actual signer.
External undeniability: For a signature presented by an external entity, O cannot falsely deny that the signature was not generated by either O or P.
Internal undeniability: For a valid signature, neither O nor P can falsely deny the generation of the signature.
One-timeness: For every delegation operation, no more than one valid proxy signature can be securely generated by P.
Based on the model introduced, we propose a proxy signature scheme that meets all the above-mentioned security requirements. Since the signatures generated by the original self-proxy signer and P are indistinguishable, our scheme provides privacy to P. Further, our scheme can resolve any repudiation dispute between V and O as well as that between O and P. Furthermore, our scheme is a onetime signature scheme and therefore can be used to restrict the number of proxy signatures P can generate. Moreover, the warrant in our scheme can include additional parameters such as expiration time, liability amount etc. to further restrict the ability of P to an intended application.
Most proxy signature schemes based on delegation by warrant proposed in literature use consecutive execution of signature schemes for delegation operation (a signed certificate containing proxy-key) and the actual proxy signature. This is inefficient in that to generate or verify a proxy signature, the effort spent is twice the effort spent for a regular signature operation. Our scheme is based on online/offline signature scheme proposed by Shamir and Tauman [6] . In our scheme the delegation operation between O and P is done in offline phase and the proxy signature is generated by P in online phase. We show that our scheme, rather than adopting consecutive operations, splits the computational efforts between online and offline phase such that the overall computational effort is reduced. Specifically, our scheme only requires P to solve a linear equation in online phase to generate a valid proxy signature.
Related work
Following Mambo et al. [5] , many variations of proxy signature schemes have been proposed based on different features. Kim et al. [7] included a warrant in proxy signature. Owing to the warrant, O can restrict the message type that can be signed. However, the identity of P included in the warrant renders the scheme unsuitable for applications where privacy of P is important. In the scheme proposed by Shum and Wei [8] , the real identity of P is hidden behind an alias. Although an external entity cannot know the actual identity of the signer, multiple signatures from the same signer can be linked using the alias. Also, Sun and Hsieh [9] showed that Shum and Wei's scheme is insecure against O's forgery. Lee et al. [10] identified several security weaknesses in the schemes originally proposed by Mambo et al. and introduced the concept of strong and weak proxy signatures according to undeniable property. Strong proxy signature represents both O's and P's signatures, while weak proxy signature represent only O's signature. The proposed strong proxy signatures provided nonrepudiation for both O and P. However, in this scheme there is no restriction on P's signing ability and therefore P could generate more than one valid signatures for more than one message using the proxy key. Kim et al. [11] introduced a one-time proxy signature concept to put restrictions on signing ability of P. In this scheme, like our model, each proxy key can be used to sign only one message. Other one-time signature schemes have been proposed in [12] [13] . Hwang et al. [14] proposed a c-times digital signature scheme which restricts the number of messages that can be signed to a variable c. If more than cmessages are signed, the Lagrange interpolation method can be used with the c-degree polynomial to compute signer's secret signing key. Choi et al. [15] also proposed a proxy signature scheme based on Schnorr's scheme to restrict the number of signatures P can generate. This scheme is mainly proposed to counter key exposure problem. Further, the scheme is not presented with a comprehensive analysis of security requirements it meets and therefore it is difficult to analyse security of this scheme. Many other schemes with different variations have been proposed in [4, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] .
To the best of our knowledge, only the scheme proposed by Kim et al. [11] satisfies all the security requirements recompiled by Bamasak and Zhang in [24] . Kim et al.'s scheme is tailored for secret computations for mobile agents using fail-stop signatures. This scheme is more complex and inefficient as compared to our proposed scheme. All the schemes discussed above can be classified into different categories on the basis of cryptography in use, nonrepudiation properties, protection of P's identity, proxy signing restrictions, etc.
Review of Shamir and Tauman's scheme
We first review the trapdoor hash families presented by Shamir and Tauman [6] and then review the online/offline signature scheme based on the trapdoor hash families.
Trapdoor hash families
A trapdoor hash family, introduced in [25] and formally defined in [6] , consists of a pair ðI ; HÞ, where I is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm, and H is a family of randomised hash family: (For a comprehensive study on trapdoor related schemes, refer to [26] ). I generates a pair (HK, TK), where HK is a hash key, and TK is its associated trapdoor key. A trapdoor hash function in H is a hash function with a trapdoor secret. It is represented as h HK ðm; sÞ where HK is a public key, TK a private key, m is a message, and s is an auxiliary random number.
A trapdoor hash function must satisfy the following three requirements [6] :
Efficiency: Given a hash key HK and a pair (m,s), h HK ðm; sÞ is computable in polynomial time.
Collision resistance: There is no probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm A that on input HK outputs, with a probability which is not negligible, 
Signature scheme
In [6] Shamir and Tauman introduced a hash-sign-switch paradigm in which any regular digital signature scheme combined with a trapdoor hash family in ðI ; HÞ can be converted into a online/offline signature scheme. Basically, in the offline phase, a signer generates a hash value to commit to an arbitrarily selected message. In the online phase, given a message, the signer finds a collision of the trapdoor hash to the previously calculated hash value. The collision point and the signature generated in offline phase can be presented as the signature for message generated in online phase. Let h HK ðm; sÞ be a trapdoor hash function, HK be the hash key, TK be the associated trapdoor key, VK be the verification key, and SK be the signing key for any regular digital signature scheme. The following describes the online/offline signature scheme:
Key generation algorithm GEN: Generate a pair (SK, VK) using a public-key generation algorithm and a pair (TK, HK) using algorithm I . The signing key is (SK, TK, HK) and the verification key is (VK, HK).
Signing algorithm SIGN: Given a signing key (SK, TK, HK) the signing algorithm operates as follows:
- 
Our proxy signature scheme
We modify the online/offline scheme reviewed in Section 3 to use it as an efficient proxy signature scheme.
Signature scheme
Unlike regular signature schemes, proxy signature schemes have two signers: original signer O and proxy signer P. In our proxy signature scheme, the key generation operation, delegation operation, and partial signing operation are performed offline; actual signature generation and verification are performed online. Let h HK ðm; sÞ be a trapdoor hash function, HK be the hash key, TK be the associated trapdoor key, ðSK O ; VK O Þ and ðSK P ; VK P Þ be the pairs of signing and verification keys for any regular digital signature scheme for O and P, respectively. The following describes our proxy signature scheme:
Key generation algorithm PRO-GEN: O and P generate corresponding pairs ðSK O ; VK O Þ and ðSK P ; VK P Þ using a public-key generation algorithm. P generates a pair (TK, HK) using algorithm I . The proxy signing key is ðSK P ; TK; HKÞ and the verification key is ðVK O ; HKÞ.
Delegation algorithm PRO-DEL: P randomly selects ðm; sÞ and computes h HK ðm; sÞ. P then uses SK P to sign h HK ðm; sÞ along with HK to obtain signature hS SK P ðh HK ðm; sÞ; HKÞi. P presents this signature to O. O stores a copy of the signature and prepares a delegation warrant (W) containing h HK ðm; sÞ; HK, other algorithm specific public parameters, and signature restrictions (expiration time, liability amount, etc. 
Internal dispute resolution
We discuss two scenarios for internal dispute between signers O and P.
Dispute 1:
In this dispute, P repudiates generation of valid signature hS SK O ðW Þ; s 00 ; W i for message m 00 .
Case 1: P is the actual signer: From the presented signature, O extracts HK. O then presents to judge J, the stored signature hS SK P ðh HK ðm; sÞ; HKÞi of P on HK, collected during the delegation phase. This signature is presented to J to prove that HK was selected by P as a hash key during the delegation phase for trapdoor hash value h HK ðm; sÞ. Therefore the dispute resolves in favour of O. Case 2: O is the actual signer: In this case, O cannot present P's signature hS SK P ðh HK ðm; sÞ; HKÞi mentioned in case 1 under cryptographic assumption of the signature algorithm in use. Therefore, the dispute resolves in favour of P.
Dispute 2:
In this dispute, O claims that P violated the one-timeness of delegation right by signing multiple messages using the same warrant. Let m 0 and m 00 be the presented messages claimed to be signed by P using warrant W. 0 q 0 ¼ 2lðnÞ divides 2x. In essence, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm such that given input HK, it outputs a multiple of fðnÞ for the trapdoor function. In [27] Miller shows that the factorisation of n, the trapdoor key TKðp; qÞ, can be computed from any multiple of fðnÞ.
Case 2: P has not signed multiple messages: Due to the collision resistance property [6] ; s 00 Þ. Therefore O cannot provide sufficient information to enable J to derive secret key TK corresponding to hash key HK used by P to generate proxy signature. Thus the dispute resolves in favour of P.
Security analysis
We prove that our proposed signature scheme satisfies all of the security requirements listed in Section 1.
Strong unforgeability: Since the key pair (TK, HK) is generated by P, only P, not even O, knows trapdoor secret TK. In order to generate a proxy signature on message m 0 , P uses TK to find collision such that h HK ðm; sÞ ¼ h HK ðm 0 ; s 0 Þ. Under collision resistance property of the trapdoor function in use, it is computationally infeasible for anybody to find collision without knowing trapdoor secret TK.
Verifiability: From the verification algorithm PRO-VERF, V validates delegation by using O's public key, VK O , to verify O's signature on warrant W. Since W contains other public parameters such as h HK ðm; sÞ, HK, etc. for proxy signature, V uses these parameters to compare the hash values and validate the proxy signature. Since the entire verification operation uses only public parameters, our scheme achieves this property.
Signature indistinguishability: The warrant of delegation in our scheme does not include identity of the proxy signer. Instead, the warrant includes hash key HK and hash value h HK ðm; sÞ which are independent of the actual identity of the proxy signer. Since the keys to generate and verify the signature (TK, HK) are independent of the identity of the signer, V can use the same verification algorithm regardless of the actual identity of the signer.
Signature unlinkability: As mentioned, V can use the same verification algorithm regardless of the actual identity of the signer. Further, if a signer holds multiple warrants for multiple proxy signatures, the hash key HK and hash value h HK ðm; sÞ for each warrant are independent of the actual identity of the signer. Therefore no third party, including V, can link two signatures from the same actual signer.
External undeniability: For a given message, if the V can present a signature that passes the verification under regular signature assumption, O cannot falsely deny the generation of the signature either by himself or by P.
Internal undeniability: As discussed under dispute 1 in Section 4.2.1, for a given valid signature, the actual identity of the signer can be determined.
One-timeness: As discussed under dispute 2 in Section 4.2.2, for every delegation, if P generates more than one proxy signature, the trapdoor key TK can be derived. That is, for a delegation, P cannot securely generate more than one proxy signatures.
Conclusions
In practice the delegation of signing ability need not be a publicly known operation. Any party other than the signers need not be concerned about the actual identity of the signer as long as a valid signature is presented for verification. However, in case of repudiation, the internal disputes between the signers need to be resolved. Further, it may be very important to restrict the signing ability of the proxy signer. Furthermore, true privacy is provided to the signer if the actual identity of the signer cannot be determined by a third party via any kind of traffic analysis. Most importantly, all these features need to be provided in an efficient manner.
Our proposed model provides all the mentioned features efficiently in that, rather than adopting consecutive signature operations for delegation and proxy signature generation, the computational load is split between online and offline phases. 
